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newsRed Hat AITrust 88 · LabPublished 28d agoLive · 26d ago

Why prompt-level guardrails aren't enough: The platform security layers production agents need

An agent charged $4,000 to the wrong customer billing account. Nobody noticed until Monday. The agent wasn't broken—it was working exactly as designed. It had broad API credentials, the model picked a plausible but wrong account identifier, and nothing in the infrastructure stopped the call from going through. No identity boundary. No scope limit. No audit trail.I've seen teams react to failures like this by adding more checks inside the agent code—if-else blocks, hardcoded allowlists, manual cr

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