Formal Mechanisms for Market Stability in Self-Interested Agent Societies: A Marketplace Simulation Study
Self-interested agents, left unconstrained, tend toward defection in repeated social dilemmas, causing cooperative gains from trade to collapse. This paper investigates what formal mechanisms, layered on top of unrestricted communication, are sufficient for a society of such agents to maintain market stability, and how resilient those mechanisms are to adversarial attack. We instantiate the research question as a multi-agent marketplace simulation where 18 LLM agents (DeepSeek-V3) with complementary production specialties must trade within a constrained social network to obtain utility. We con
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- LinkedLinked via arxiv author · 85%Eugene Ng Yi Sheng →
“Formal Mechanisms for Market Stability in Self-Interested Agent Societies: A Marketplace Simulation Study”
- LinkedLinked via arxiv author · 85%Bingquan Shen →
“Formal Mechanisms for Market Stability in Self-Interested Agent Societies: A Marketplace Simulation Study”